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Introduction
Since the end of apartheid, South African freedom fighters have
worked to remedy the former regime’s legacy of discrimination and vio-
lence.  Their efforts have afforded South Africans access to a constitution
steeped in the ideals of “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and
the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”1  Nevertheless, there is
much more to be done to heal the Rainbow Nation’s wounds.  Questions
related to labor and employment remain particularly contentious, espe-
† Vanderbilt University, B.A. Luso-Brazilian and International Studies, 2014;
Cornell Law School, J.D. Candidate, 2019. I would like to thank the Editorial Board
members for their help and feedback.  I would also like to extend my gratitude to my
family, friends, partner, and professors for their support. Finally, I am deeply grateful
for having the opportunity to visit South Africa, a country as magnificent as it is
inspiring for everyone in the African diaspora.
1. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 1, § 1(a).
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cially as taxi and Uber drivers clash over the e-hailing company’s controver-
sial business model,2 and Uber drivers strive to secure their rights as
employees.3
August 2018 marks Uber’s fifth anniversary in Africa.4  Since it
launched on the continent, Uber has established itself in more than a
dozen African metropolitan areas.5  Uber’s African subsidiaries also boast
more than 60,000 drivers,6 and roughly 1.8 million commuters enjoy the
company’s services.7  Uber’s operations in sub-Saharan Africa are espe-
cially impressive, and the South African market dominates in the region.8
In fact, South Africa lies far ahead of Kenya, the second largest sub-Saharan
African market, with nearly one million active users recorded in 2017 com-
pared to Kenya’s 363,000 active users.9
Unsurprisingly, Uber’s innovative business model has consistently
challenged the ways in which jurists envision labor relationships.  In par-
ticular, courts across the globe have disagreed over whether to classify
Uber drivers as employees, independent contractors, or something entirely
different.10  Having deciphered similar dilemmas in the past, South
2. See Jason Burke, Violence Erupts between Taxi and Uber Divers in Johannesburg,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/08/vio
lence-erupts-taxi-uber-drivers-johannesburg [https://perma.cc/J4W2-LVTW]; see also
Loni Prinsloo, South African Metered-Taxi Operators Attacking Uber Drivers, BLOOMBERG
(July 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-17/south-africa-
meter-taxi-operators-attacking-uber-drivers (reporting on attacks against Uber drivers)
[https://perma.cc/ESE8-84HG]; South African Taxis Block Roads to Main Airport in Uber
Protest, REUTERS, (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-uber-tech/
south-african-taxis-block-roads-to-main-airport-in-uber-protest-idUSKBN16H1PB
(reporting on a protest at the main airport in Johannesburg) [https://perma.cc/93JX-
VDLS].
3. See Dewald Van Rensburg, False Start for Uber Drivers’ Employee Claim, NEWS24
(Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.fin24.com/Tech/Companies/false-start-for-uber-drivers-
employee-claim-20180119 [https://perma.cc/SVC3-XQ5L].
4. See Abdi Latif Dahir, Uber’s Four-Year Journey through Africa’s Fast-Changing Cit-
ies Has Been Bumpy, but Disruptive, QUARTZ (Sept. 30, 2017), https://qz.com/1090738/
uber-is-marking-four-years-in-africa/ [https://perma.cc/SF85-75NJ].; see also Toby Shap-
shak, South African Politician Attacked, Beaten by Anti-Uber Taxi Drivers, FORBES (May
16, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tobyshapshak/2016/05/16/south-african-pol
i tician-attacked-beaten-by-anti-uber-taxi-drivers-2/#22a804bb6dba (“Johannesburg was
Uber [sic] first city in Africa— which began operating in August 2013— and now it oper-
ates in five cities in South Africa, including Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth and
Pretoria.”) [https://perma.cc/25EJ-RFDK].
5. See Burke, supra note 2.
6. Tom Jackson, Blocked Traffic, Immolated Cars: Uber’s Problems in Africa, FORTUNE
(Apr. 24, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/24/uber-problems-africa-expansion/
[https://perma.cc/TA59-LSTF].
7. See Annie Njanja, Uber Ranks Kenya Second Biggest Market in Africa, BUSINESS
DAILY (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/companies/
Uber-ranks-Kenya-second-biggest-market-in-Africa/4003102-4116644-uo5cq1/index.
html [https://perma.cc/ZGR6-BEZ6].
8. See Dahir, supra note 4.
9. Njanja, supra note 7.
10. See Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-Ending Stream of Lawsuits, CNN (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/technology/uber-lawsuits/index.html [https://
perma.cc/6EQE-7YAQ].
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Africa’s labor courts boast an array of common law tests to differentiate
between labor classifications.11  In July 2017, the Commission for Concili-
ation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”)12 turned to its arsenal of tests
to rule on Uber SA’s relationship with its drivers in South Africa.13
Ultimately, the CCMA Senior Commissioner determined that Uber SA
and South African drivers did, in fact, enjoy an employment relationship.14
Soon after, Uber SA petitioned the Labour Court to review the CCMA rul-
ing.15  After identifying a technical error in the Senior Commissioner’s
decision, among other factors, Judge Van Niekerk of the Labour Court set
the CCMA ruling aside, leaving pressing questions about Uber and its con-
troversial operations in South Africa open for future adjudication.16
This Note aims to demonstrate two points.  First, although the Labour
Court set the CCMA ruling aside on a technicality, the CCMA ruling still
offers a great deal to learn about South African labor and employment
jurisprudence.  Second, because some factors in this case conflict with an
independent contractor classification, as well as crucial policy concerns,
South African courts should, at the very least, classify Uber drivers as
employees of Uber BV (the international parent company).
The Note will proceed as follows: Section I provides a brief overview of
the South African taxi industry.  Section I also illustrates the drivers’
increasing dissatisfaction with Uber.  Next, Section II maps out the bodies
that adjudicate labor disputes, as well as the CCMA ruling and Labour
Court’s review.  To better illustrate the values that inform South African
jurisprudence and whether an employee classification for Uber drivers
aligns with these values, Section III then embarks on a comparative analy-
sis between South African and U.S. policies.  Beginning with the aforemen-
tioned Uber dilemma in South Africa and a related appeals court case in
Florida, Section III also analyzes some of the broader factors that character-
ize these jurisdictions’ diverging labor and employment interests.17  Sec-
11. See INT’L LAB. ORG. [ILO], REPORT V(1): THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 8 (2006),
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-v-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3TQ-GPMV].
12. The CCMA is one of several bodies responsible for adjudicating labor disputes in
South Africa.  Paul Benjamin, Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Media-
tion and Arbitration (CCMA) 6 (ILO, Working Paper No. 47, 2013).
13. See Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure &
Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras. 40– 41, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZACCMA/2017/1.html [https://perma.cc/CU76-AWAL].
14. See id. at para. 52.  Uber SA is Uber BV’s subsidiary in South Africa. See id. at
para. 13.  Uber BV is the international parent company, based in the Netherlands, which
concludes contracts with drivers.  Id.
15. Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. Nat’l Union of Pub. Serv. & Allied Workers
(NUPSAW) & Others [2018] ZALCCT 1 at para. 3, 2018 (4) BLLR 299 (LC), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCCT/2018/1.html [https://perma.cc/Q5AQ-L3JR].
16. Id. at para. 98.  As a result of the Labour Court decision, Uber drivers plan to
follow with a new lawsuit.  Dewald Van Rensburg, Uber Drivers Fight Back, FIN24 (Feb.
2, 2018), https://www.fin24.com/Tech/Companies/uber-drivers-fight-back-20180202
[https://perma.cc/BQ3Q-V38W].
17. Despite implementing a common law test similar to the tests endorsed in South
Africa, the appeals court judges in Florida classified Uber drivers as independent con-
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tion IV follows by assessing how an employee classification might impact
South African drivers and Uber.  Finally, Section IV ends with an argument
against a new classification for Uber drivers, given that a classification
outside of the traditional employee-independent contractor dichotomy
would further muddy our understanding of labor relationships and effec-
tively threaten the drivers’ hopes for securing their rights.
I. An Ongoing Uber-Taxi War
A. Brief Overview
Prior to the commencement of e-hailing services in Johannesburg,
transportation options in South Africa— other than personal vehicles—
included the following: minibuses, metered taxis, city buses, and trains.18
Of this group, minibuses (or kombis) and metered taxis comprised South
Africa’s taxi industry.19  Currently, a minority of taxi drivers organize
under two national trade unions— the South African Transport and Allied
Workers’ Union and the National Taxi Drivers’ Organization.20  The South
African National Taxi Council also functions as a business association for
taxi-owners.21
Even after Uber has launched in South Africa, kombis remain the most
popular means of public transportation.22  In fact, kombis provide roughly
sixty-five percent of all public transportations trips.23  Serving mostly low-
income, black commuters,24 kombis function as affordable shared taxis.25
Additionally, kombi-owners tend to purchase multiple vehicles for hired
drivers to operate,26 and although kombi-owners and drivers obtain
tractors. See McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225– 27 (Fla. 3d
Cir. Ct. 2017).
18. See Jane Barrett, Organizing in the Informal Economy: A Case Study of the Minibus
Taxi Industry in South Africa 2 (ILO, Working Paper No. 39, 2003).
19. See id. at 2.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 23.
22. See id. at 2.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1.  In addition, the vast majority of drivers and kombi-owners are black.
South Africa’s Rattletrap Taxis Move Millions— and an Economy, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-taxis/south-africas-rattletrap-taxis-move-mil
lions-and-an-economy-idUSL6N0LQ3BL20140310 [https://perma.cc/HL7U-P3WY].
The proliferation of kombis as a popular means of transportation for black South Afri-
cans, as well as the largest black-owned sector, is mostly due to policies implemented
during the apartheid regime. Id.  These policies restricted black Africans from living in
the cities where they worked; thus, minibuses developed as part a low-cost transporta-
tion system to and from distant townships. See Bill Keller, Deadly Free Market: South
Africa’s Warrior Taxis, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/
17/world/deadly-free-market-south-africa-s-warrior-taxis.html?pagewanted=all [https://
perma.cc/92V3-MCQ9].
25. See Rosita Armytage & Markus Bell, What the Violent ‘Uber Wars’ Tell Us About
Zuma’s South Africa, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 16, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/africa/what-the-violent-uber-wars-tell-us-about-zumas-south-africa-a794849
6.html [https://perma.cc/92V3-MCQ9].  The average kombi carries about fifteen com-
muters, and local taxi associations fix kombi fares. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 2.
26. Barrett, supra note 18, at 2.
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licenses to provide their services, they make up a large portion of the infor-
mal economy.27  Historically, conflicts have also arisen between kombi-
owners and metered taxis drivers, especially as individuals within each
group compete for customers and profitable routes— sometimes at the cost
of human lives.28
With regard to metered taxis, drivers typically transport commuters in
sedans.29  Provincial governments also require metered taxi owners to
acquire licenses for their operations.30  Like yellow cabs in U.S. cities, fares
fluctuate depending on the distance that a meter records.31  Also, many
metered taxi drivers operate within the informal sector, avoiding municipal
control.32  Moreover, because metered taxi rides are costly, they lack a reg-
ular commuter base, and their hold on the transportation market is diffi-
cult to ascertain.33  Still, some figures estimate that metered taxis only
account for about ten percent of the taxi transportation market in South
Africa.34
By the time Uber SA launched in August 2013,35 many commuters
were frustrated with a taxi industry characterized as unreliable, expensive,
and unsafe.36  Fierce competition between sectors, rival taxi cartels, and
taxi associations had already turned violent.37  In fact, some estimates
place the number of deaths from past “taxi wars” at somewhere between
1500 to 3000 individuals.38  Accordingly, Uber’s reputation as a reliable
and affordable service constituted a saving grace for many South Africans.
Because of their aversion to over-crowded minibuses and overpriced
metered taxis, middle-class commuters have especially enjoyed Uber’s ser-
vices.39  Foreign nationals, many of whom are unable to find employment
in their home countries and South Africa, have also capitalized on Uber’s
rapid growth,40 and today, they form a sizable demographic within the
27. Id. at 1 (stating that the majority of kombi-owners do not pay taxes, nor do they
adhere to employment standards).  Kombis are also infamous for high accident rates,
accounting for fifteen percent of the road deaths in South Africa in 1998. Id. at 12.
28. See Keller, supra note 24 (describing conflicts between drivers in the 1990s).
29. Barrett, supra note 18, at 2.
30. See How Do I Start a Private Metered Taxi Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Nov. 8, 2009),
https://www.entrepreneurmag.co.za/ask-entrepreneur/start-up-industry-specific-ask-
entrepreneur/how-do-i-start-a-private-metered-taxi-business/ [hereinafter Metered Taxi
Business] [https://perma.cc/5MXQ-DBKG].
31. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 2.  In contrast, minibuses operate on “fixed com-
muter corridors” and fares are set by taxi associations. See id.
32. See Mbongiseni Dladla, Role of Metered Taxis in the Integrated and Sustainable
Public Transportation System in Durban 37, 69 (Apr. 9, 2015) (unpublished MEng dis-
sertation, University of Johannesburg) (on file with the Faculty of Engineering and the
Built Environment, University of Johannesburg).
33. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 2.
34. See Metered Taxi Business, supra note 30.
35. See Shapshak, supra note 4.
36. See Armytage & Bell, supra note 25.
37. See id.
38. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 8.
39. See Armytage & Bell, supra note 25.
40. See id. (referring to Zimbabweans in South Africa after the collapse of their home
country’s economy).
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South African Uber driver population.41  Despite Uber’s success, however,
not everyone is a fan.  Metered taxi drivers have been particularly vocal
about their objections to Uber’s presence in South Africa.42
B. Violence and Driver Dissatisfaction
2017 saw an increase in violence between metered taxi and Uber driv-
ers.43  One statistic estimates that there were more than 200 violent attacks
between July and September of 2017.44  Reported tactics include petrol
bombs and acid throwing,45 and because of these violent attacks, several
locations have been declared “no-go zones” for Uber drivers.46  South Afri-
can authorities have also developed a special task force to address
increases in violent attacks from both sides of the conflict.47
With no end to these attacks in sight, Uber drivers have become
increasingly dissatisfied with the e-hailing app.48  Accordingly, Uber repre-
sentatives have contacted injured drivers and issued multiple statements.49
Still, several drivers in South Africa criticize Uber for not doing enough.50
Others argue that Uber’s policies have placed drivers in precarious situa-
tions; for example, drivers have voiced concerns about Uber’s regional
cash-payment option, which might increase the likelihood of violent rob-
beries.51  Moreover, although drivers are free to create their own work
41. See Uber Driver Dies in Taxi ‘War’ in South Africa, VOICE OF AMERICA (July 18,
2017), https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/uber-meter-taxi-drivers-clash-in-south-africa-/
3948870.html [https://perma.cc/HVL7-KU3T].
42. See South African Taxis Block Roads to Main Airport in Uber Protest, REUTERS
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-uber-tech/south-african-
taxis-block-roads-to-main-airport-in-uber-protest-idUSKBN16H1PB [https://perma.cc/
4MY2-QX5A].
43. See Burke, supra note 2.
44. Queenin Masuabi, Uber Customers: Screw Petitions, We Want to Be Protected, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/09/11/uber-cus
tomers-screw-petitions-we-want-to-be-protected_a_23203925/ [https://perma.cc/AN9E-
D6E5].
45. Queenin Masuabi, Drivers Under Attack: Uber and Police Are ‘Letting Us Down,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/09/08/driv
ers-under-attack-uber-and-police-are-letting-us-down_a_23201289/ [https://perma.cc/
9M33-ALW8].
46. No-Go Zones Declared as Attacks on Uber Drivers Intensifies, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 18, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/07/18/no-go-zones-declared-as-
attacks-on-uber-drivers-intensifies_a_23034863/ [https://perma.cc/4UF3-XJFX].
47. Ernest Mabuza, Task Team Formed to Address Uber-Meter Taxi Conflict: Makhura,
TIMES LIVE (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-09-17-
task-team-formed-to-address-uber-meter-taxi-conflict-makhura/ [https://perma.cc/93VD
-V89M].
48. See Lynsey Chutel, Uber Drivers in South Africa Are the Latest to Be Recognized as
Employees, QUARTZ (July 14, 2017), https://qz.com/1029485/south-african-labor-com
mission-rules-uber-drivers-should-be-regarded-as-employees/ [https://perma.cc/KSZ3-
YTRQ].
49. See Bafana Nzimande, Uber Driver Blames Company for Acid Attack, TIMES LIVE
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-22-uber-driver
-blames-company-for-acid-attack/ [https://perma.cc/Q3AF-FNND].
50. See id.
51. See Gabriele Steinhauser & Alexandra Wexler, Uber’s Cash Service Fuels Tension
in South Africa, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-cash-
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schedules, this supposed advantage has led to long hours and low wages.52
Some drivers have even reported being unjustly deactivated from the e-hail-
ing app.53  Ultimately, these are the very conditions that prompted Uber
drivers to seek justice via the CCMA.54
II. The Courts and Uber
A. Adjudicatory Bodies in South Africa
The following bodies are responsible for adjudicating labor disputes in
South Africa: the CCMA; the Labour Court; and the Labour Appeal
Court.55
The CCMA functions as an independent dispute resolution body.56
As such, it hears all disputes related to “unfair dismissals, trade union orga-
nizational rights, the interpretation of collective agreements and certain
individual unfair labor practices, as well as interest disputes arising from
collective bargaining.”57  Moreover, since it launched in 1995, the CCMA
has worked to provide affordable, accessible, expeditious, and informal dis-
pute resolution for all South Africans.58  With arbitrations constituting the
CCMA’s preferred route for unresolved rights disputes and dismissals,59
the CCMA has also enjoyed an impressive national settlement rate of sev-
enty percent and higher.60
service-fuels-tensions-in-south-africa-1470994202 [https://perma.cc/H9AS-VHBZ].
After significant pressure from South African drivers, Uber now allows its drivers to
decide whether they should offer services to cash-paying commuters.  Bafana Nzimande,
Uber’s New Payment System Lets Drivers Reject Cash Trips, TIMES LIVE (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-10-ubers-new-payment-system-
lets-drivers-reject-cash-trips/ [https://perma.cc/M3FU-YNEM].
52. See Yomi Kazeem, “They’re Treating Us Like Rubbish”: Uber Drivers in South
Africa Have Joined a Union, QUARTZ (July 6, 2016), https://qz.com/724310/theyre-treat
ing-us-like-rubbish-uber-drivers-in-south-africa-have-joined-a-union/ [https://perma.cc/
KU9J-H5DD].
53. See Chutel, supra note 48.  Uber drivers in South Africa operate under the com-
pany’s sub-Saharan Africa deactivation policy.  Kylie, Driver Deactivation Policy— Sub-
Saharan Africa Only, UBER BLOG (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.uber.com/en-ZA/blog/
johannesburg/driver-deactivation-policy/ [https://perma.cc/MLQ9-5REH].  Under this
regional deactivation policy, Uber scrutinizes drivers according to several factors, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the following: star ratings, ride cancellation rates, and safe-driv-
ing. Id.  If a driver’s rating falls below a certain performance level, Uber provides
suggestions for improvement; nevertheless, Uber retains the right to deactivate drivers
when drivers fail to improve their rating. Id.
54. See Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure &
Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras. 9– 10, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZACCMA/2017/1.html [https://perma.cc/CU76-AWAL].
55. See Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995 §§ 115, 158, 167 (S. Afr.).
56. Vision, Mission & Values, COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRA-
TION, https://www.ccma.org.za/About-Us/Vision-Mission-Values [https://perma.cc/
G6EV-EDH6].  The CCMA also functions as a juristic person.  LRA 66 of 1995 § 112 (S.
Afr.).
57. See Benjamin, supra note 12, at 6.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See Our History, COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION,
https://www.ccma.org.za/About-Us/Our-History [https://perma.cc/K9U3-HPM9].
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The Labour Court constitutes the next body that adjudicates labor dis-
putes, sharing the same status as South Africa’s High Courts.61  Unlike the
high courts, however, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over dis-
putes about operational requirements, strike dismissals, alleged discrimi-
natory dismissals, and unfair discrimination.62  In addition, the Labour
Court is responsible for reviewing CCMA arbitration awards.63  These
reviews now compose a large part of the Labour Court’s work.64  The
Labour Court also has exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the “LRA”).65  Finally, the Labour Court
is led by a Judge President, Deputy Judge President, and however many
other judges the Judge President deems necessary for the court to function
efficiently.66
Following a decision by the Labour Court, parties can turn to the
Labour Appeal Court for review.67  Generally, the authors of the LRA
intended for the Labour Appeal Court to serve as the court of final instance
for deciding labor disputes and interpreting the LRA.68  As such, a Judge
President and a Deputy Judge from the Labour Court act in these same
capacities when they sit on the Labour Appeal Court.69  Interestingly, how-
ever, the Labour Appeal Court’s decisions are not necessarily final.70
Rather, under special circumstances, the Supreme Court of Appeal may
intervene and overturn the Labour Appeal Court’s decisions.71  In an
increasing number of cases, the Constitutional Court has also resolved
matters about the interpretation of labor legislation.72
B. Recent Decisions and Unanswered Questions
The CCMA ruling in question centers on Uber SA’s motion in
limine.73  In this motion, Uber SA challenged the CCMA’s jurisdiction over
the deactivated drivers’ claims.74  These claims, which were consolidated
for the purposes of the motion, centered on the premise that Uber SA
wrongfully deactivated the drivers from the e-hailing company’s services.75
61. Benjamin, supra note 12, at 6.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 6– 7.  Nevertheless, the Labour Court’s exclusive jurisdiction does not
apply to all employment matters. Id. at 7.
66. See LRA 66 of 1995 § 152 (S. Afr.).
67. See Benjamin, supra note 12, at 7.
68. Id. at 7.
69. See LRA 66 of 1995 § 168 (S. Afr.).
70. See Benjamin, supra note 12, at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others
[2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras. 1– 3, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACCMA/
2017/1.html [https://perma.cc/CU76-AWAL].
74. Id. at paras. 9– 10.
75. See id. at paras. 3, 9– 10.  For the purposes of deciphering Uber’s business
model, it is important to understand the difference between driver-partners and drivers-
only. See infra note 105.
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In addition, because the Senior Commissioner determined that it would
have been unreasonable for the drivers to direct their claims at Uber BV
(the international parent company that concluded their contracts), the
CCMA ruling only concerns Uber’s subsidiary in South Africa, Uber SA.76
According to the Senior Commissioner, “Uber SA is, for all intents and pur-
poses, Uber in South Africa,” and the drivers’ relationship with Uber BV
was of “no relevance.”77
In their initial claims, the respondents to the motion referred to their
deactivations as  “unfair dismissal[s].”78  Their choice of language invoked
the LRA, which states the following: “Every employee has the right not to
be (a) unfairly dismissed; and (b) subjected to unfair labour practice.”79
Hence, the drivers presented their cases as wronged employees, not inde-
pendent contractors,80 and they demanded the various remedies codified
by the LRA, which include reinstatement and compensation.81  Ultimately,
Uber SA challenged the CCMA’s jurisdiction on the basis that the drivers
were never Uber SA employees.82  In fact, Uber BV’s contract with the
respondents explicitly identified them as independent contractors.83
In the CCMA ruling, the Senior Commissioner emphasized that her
role was “limited to determining whether Uber drivers are employees for
the purposes of the Labour Relations Act, in particular the right not to be
unfairly dismissed.”84  Nevertheless, the LRA does not describe the factors
76. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at para. 32.
Therefore, the Senior Commissioner rejected the drivers’ joinder to include Uber BV.
Shazia Ebrahim, Uber SA Runs Into the ‘Worker vs Innovation’ Tension, THE DAILY VOX
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.thedailyvox.co.za/uber-sa-runs-into-the-worker-vs-innova
tion-tension-shaazia-ebrahim/ [https://perma.cc/7V8C-28ZU].
77. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at para. 59.
78. Id. at para. 10.
79. LRA 66 of 1995 § 185 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added).
80. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at para. 12.
81. See LRA 66 of 1995 § 193 (S. Afr.).
82. Uber SA’s argument in support of an independent contractor classification relied
on six points, as follows: (1) drivers are not legally obligated to drive Uber registered
vehicles or use Uber’s e-hailing application; (2) Uber does not retain any right to instruct
a driver to drive his/her vehicle, and the driver is free to choose where he/she will drive
and which passenger he/she will allow into his/her vehicle; (3) a partner-driver is free to
hire another person to drive; (4) drivers are not restricted to working for Uber, and they
may work for competitors; (5) a driver-partner supplies a vehicle and is responsible for
all “associated expenses”; and (6) a driver-partner bears the risks of profits or loss as an
independent contractor, and a driver is free to move from one partner to another. See
NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras. 24– 26.  The
drivers countered these points by arguing the following: (1) riders contract Uber, not
drivers, and Uber issues receipts for its services; (2) Uber controls drivers via its rating
system, pricing, power to deactivate drivers, and by limiting the number of drivers in
given areas; (4) Uber maintains incentive schemes to control performance; (5) a driver
cannot have another person drive on his/her account, and driving must be “performed
personally.” See id. at paras. 27– 31.  Moreover, according to the Senior Commissioner,
the respondents appear to deal directly with Uber SA, not Uber BV, regardless of
whether Uber BV is the party responsible for concluding their contracts. See id. at para.
32.
83. Id. at para. 14.
84. Id. at para. 35 (emphasis added).  According to Section 213 of the LRA, an
employee is defined as follows: “(a) [A]ny person, excluding an independent contractor,
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that separate an employee from an independent contractor.85  Thus, the
Senior Commissioner explored a series of common law tests to differenti-
ate between the two labor classifications.86
The Senior Commissioner specifically turned to the tests that South
African jurists have endorsed in the “Code of Good Practice: Who is An
Employee” (the “Code”).87  Out of the many tests that South African courts
have developed, these guidelines explicitly endorse the “dominant impres-
sion” test,88 which encourages jurists to examine labor relationships based
on a variety of factors.89  Interestingly, however, the Senior Commissioner
identified another comprehensive test in the Code, which she deemed the
“reality of the relationship” test.”90  This implicit test— and not the Code’s
dominant impression test per se— would serve as the cornerstone of her
analysis.
who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive,
any remuneration; and (b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on
or conducting the business of an employer, and ‘employed’ and ‘employment’ have
meanings corresponding to that of ‘employee.’”  LRA 66 of 1995 § 213 (S. Afr.) (empha-
sis added).  Regarding Part (a), the Senior Commissioner emphasized that it is “the line
between independent contractors and employees that . . . courts and arbitrators have
grappled with.” NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at para.
38.  Accordingly, the respondents’ relationships with Uber fit better within the broader
definition in Part (b). See id. at para. 37.
85. See LRA 66 of 1995 § 213 (S. Afr.).
86. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras.
39– 41.
87. See id.
88. See NAT’L ECON. DEV. & LAB. COUNC. [NEDLAC], CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE: WHO
IS AN EMPLOYEE ¶ 32, at 17 (2006).
89. The Code lists six factors that are crucial, but not exhaustive, for distinguishing
a contract of employment from a contract for services, as follows: (1) whether the object
of the contract is to render personal services or produce a specified result; (2) whether
the individual performs services personally or through others; (3) whether an employer
may choose when to make use of the individual’s services or whether the individual is
required to perform work or produce results within a period fixed by a contract; (4)
whether the individual is subservient to the lawful commands of an employer or a con-
tract, not under supervision or control; (5) whether a contract ends when the individual
dies; and (6) whether a contract ends once the period of service in a contract expires or
when work or production is completed. Id.
90. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at para. 41.
The Senior Commissioner highlighted the language of “real relationships” in Item 52 of
the Code, which reads: “Courts . . . must determine whether a person is an employee or
independent contractor based on the dominant impression gained from considering all
relevant factors that emerge from an examination of the realities of the parties’ relation-
ship.” NEDLAC, supra note 88, ¶ 52, at 24 (emphasis added).  In the Labour Court’s
review of the CCMA ruling, however, Judge Van Niekerk referred to the reality of rela-
tionships test as “no more than the assertion that where the parties have concluded an
agreement to structure the relationship between [sic] in a particular form, that does not
preclude the court from enquiring into the substance of the agreement and to determine
that despite the terms of the contract, an employment relationship exists.” Uber South
Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. Nat’l Union of Pub. Serv. & Allied Workers (NUPSAW) & Others
[2018] ZALCCT 1 at para. 75, 2018 (4) BLLR 399 (LC), available at http://
www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCCT/2018/1.html [https://perma.cc/PGV5-EY39].  Ulti-
mately, Judge Van Niekerk of the Labour Court doubted whether the Senior Commis-
sioner identified a new test at all, given that her approach “bear[ed] close resemblance to
the dominant impression test.” Id. at para. 77.
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According to the Senior Commissioner, the reality of the relationship
test, like the dominant impression test, draws from a series of common law
tests.91  Nevertheless, the reality of the relationship test takes the analysis a
step further, urging jurists to look beyond a contract’s language and
examine the relationship between the parties as it exists in real time and
space.92  After applying this test, the Senior Commissioner concluded that
Uber SA’s relationship with its drivers was direct enough and marked by
sufficient control to classify the drivers as employees.93
After the CCMA ruling, it appeared that South African jurists had
finally resolved the Uber dilemma.  Upon review, however, the Labour
Court in Cape Town saw otherwise.94  Judge Van Niekerk of the Labour
Court argued that the Senior Commissioner made a fatal error of law by
denying Uber SA’s jurisdictional challenge, given that the parties lacked
any contractual arrangement that would render the drivers’ initial claims
judiciable.95  Ultimately, however, Judge Van Niekerk overturned the
CCMA ruling based on a technicality,96 arguing that even if there was no
need for a contractual agreement between the parties, the Senior Commis-
sioner failed to distinguish Uber SA from Uber BV and recognize their
unique relationships with the drivers.97
As it stands, the drivers will petition for a new hearing to secure their
rights as employees.98  Based on Judge Van Niekerk’s reasoning, it appears
that some of the claims the drivers made against Uber SA may be better
suited in an action against Uber BV.99  For example, driver-partners actu-
ally conclude electronic agreements with Uber BV.100  Uber BV also
91. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at para. 41.
92. See id.
93. See id. at paras. 41– 59 (demonstrating several factors that speak to an employ-
ment relationship, including Uber’s control over the drivers’ performance and work con-
ditions, as well as their economic dependency on Uber).
94. See Nat’l Union of Pub. Serv. & Allied Workers (NUPSAW) & Others [2018]
ZALCCT 1 at para. 97– 98.
95. See id. at para. 72.  Judge Van Niekerk pointed to a Labour Appeal Court deci-
sion that determined a party must “establish the existence of a contractual relationship
between that party and any putative employer.” Id. at para. 70 (citing Universal Church
of the Kingdom of God v. Myeni & Others [2015] ZALCCT 31 at para. 49, 2015 (9) BLLR
918 (LC), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALAC/2015/31.html [https://
perma.cc/9KD6-UJXL]).
96. See id. at paras.  97– 98.
97. Id.  Considering the Senior Commissioner never joined Uber BV to the proceed-
ings, Judge Van Niekerk’s decision only ruled on Uber SA’s relationship with the drivers.
See id. at para. 98.  Accordingly, Judge Van Niekerk left any issues related to Uber BV’s
relationship with the drivers open for future adjudication. See id.
98. South African Uber Drivers Fight Back, MYBROADBAND (Feb. 4, 2018), https://
mybroadband.co.za/news/motoring/247518-south-african-uber-drivers-fight-back.html
[https://perma.cc/ZWA6-NEE5].
99. See Ebrahim, supra note76.  According to Judge Van Niekerk: “Each of the build-
ing blocks of the drivers’ case pertains to Uber BV and not Uber SA.” Nat’l Union of Pub.
Serv. & Allied Workers (NUPSAW) & Others [2018] ZALCCT 1 at para. 97.
100. Id. at para. 83.  An electronic agreement could potentially satisfy the need for a
contractual relationship between parties, which Judge Van Niekerk cited as precedent.
See id. at para. 70 (citing Myeni & Others [2015] ZALCCT 31 at para. 49).
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devises and implements the deactivation policy and rating system,101 and
an Uber BV response team currently handles rider complaints about driv-
ers in South Africa.102  Furthermore, Uber BV licenses individuals to use
the e-hailing app.103  Some of these factors certainly suggest an employ-
ment relationship,104 while other factors are unclear and require further
investigation.105  Surely, courts will have to consult more resources to iden-
tify the reality of the relationships between Uber BV and drivers in South
Africa.106
III. From the Rainbow Nation to the Sunshine State— A Comparative
Analysis
To better demonstrate why an employee classification for Uber drivers
in the Rainbow Nation is not as far-fetched as some would think, it is help-
ful to compare South African law with American ideas about labor relation-
ships and employment rights.  This section begins with McGillis v. the
Department of Economic Opportunity, where, despite the Florida appeals
court’s reliance on tests similar to those endorsed in South Africa, the
court in McGillis envisioned Uber’s relationship with a driver quite differ-
ently.107  Specifically, the McGillis case centered on a former Uber driver’s
101. Id. at para. 90– 91.
102. Id. at paras. 91.
103. Id. at para. 92.
104. Under the dominant impression test, “[a]n employee is subject to the employer’s
right of control and supervision while an independent contractor is notionally on a foot-
ing equal with the employer and . . . . [t]he right of control by an employer . . . . can be
seen in an employer’s right to instruct or direct an employee to do certain things and then
to supervise how those things are done.” NEDLAC, supra note 88, ¶ 39, at 20 (emphasis
added).  As demonstrated prior, Uber exercises control over drivers via its deactivation
policy, where drivers are regularly scrutinized under various criteria, including star rat-
ings, ride cancellation rates, and safe-driving, and Uber retains the right to deactivate
drivers if their performance level fails to improve. See Kylie, supra note 53.
105. The dominant impression also identifies an employer requiring an employee to
perform services personally as a defining feature of employment. NEDLAC, supra note
88, ¶ 36, at 18– 19.  One outstanding issue related to this factor concerns so-called
driver-partners versus drivers-only. See Nat’l Union of Pub. Serv. & Allied Workers (NUP-
SAW) & Others [2018] ZALCCT 1 at para. 92.  In essence, driver-partners may conclude
contracts with drivers-only to operate other vehicles, providing for another layer of labor
relationships. See id.  This additional layer of labor relationship also implies a potential
co-employment relationship where Uber BV and a driver-only lack substantial contact
with each other, except through the driver-partner. See id. at paras. 92, 98.  In this type
of case, a driver-partner can function as a middle-person that provides the driver-only
with a registered vehicle and remuneration. See id.  According to the guidelines in the
Code, however, it is feasible for both the sub-contractor and the workers that he or she
has contracted to be employees of the principal contractor— the principal contractor in
this case being Uber BV. NEDLAC, supra note 88, ¶ 37, at 19.
106. The courts can also turn to Section 200(a) of the LRA and Section 83(a) of the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) for other factors to consider when “assess-
ing whether an employment relationship exists.” Id. ¶ 44, at 21.
107. See 210 So.3d 220, 225– 26 (Fla. 3d Cir. Ct. 2017); see also Douglas Hanks, Uber
Wins Big in Court After Miami Driver Denied Unemployment Benefits, MIAMI HERALD (Feb.
1, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/arti-
cle130050824.html (summarizing Uber’s victory in this case) [https://perma.cc/X6Z4-
H2E3].
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appeal of a decision by the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity
(the “Department”).108  After Uber deactivated the driver from its services,
the Department denied his request for unemployment benefits.109  The
driver then filed an appeal, declaring that he was entitled to unemployment
benefits as a former Uber employee.110  Ultimately, the Florida appeals
court upheld the Department’s decision, underlining the independence
that the driver enjoyed and the driver’s contract with Uber, which explicitly
disclaimed any employment relationship.111
A. Similar Tests Across Jurisdictions
Although the Florida judges and CCMA Senior Commissioner ruled
differently, the precedents and guidelines they consulted are somewhat
similar.  First, when distinguishing between an employment relationship
and a contract with an independent contractor, Florida courts emphasize
the importance of contractual language; indeed, courts tend to honor con-
tractual provisions unless there are indicators that suggest some sort of
misclassification.112  Similarly, in South Africa, the Code recognizes that
“[i]n certain cases, the legal relationship between the parties may be gath-
ered from . . . the contract that the parties have concluded.”113
Additionally, Florida courts may look to the reality of the parties’ rela-
tionship, given that a contract does not always accurately depict a labor
relationship.114  Like adjudicatory bodies in South Africa, these courts
evaluate ill-defined labor relationships based on multiple factors, including
control, remuneration, and the length of time one party has worked for the
other.115  Of these factors, Florida courts highlight “control” as the most
important factor in their analyses.116  Although the Code in South Africa
does not necessarily identify control as the single most important factor, it
does state that an “employer’s right of control is . . . a very significant indi-
cator of an employment relationship.”117
B. Values and Points of Divergence
Given these factors, it is reasonable to assume that South African and
Florida adjudicatory bodies might envision labor relationships similarly.
Nevertheless, common law tests are not perfect.118  Moreover, the factors
108. 210 So.3d at 221.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 221– 22.
111. Id. at 225– 26.
112. See id. at 224.
113. NEDLAC, supra note 88, ¶ 28, at 14.
114. See McGillis, 210 So.3d at 224– 25.
115. Compare id., with Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo
Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras. 42– 52, available at http://
www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACCMA/2017/1.html [https://perma.cc/7DWA-WKSN].
116. See McGillis, 210 So.3d at 224– 25.
117. NEDLAC, supra note 88, ¶ 40, at 20 (emphasis added).
118. See Martin Brassey, The Nature of Employment, 11 INDUS. L.J. 889, 920 (1990).
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listed in these decisions are not exhaustive.119  Finally, as this Note will
demonstrate below, South Africa and the United States have unique exper-
iences regarding organized labor movements and fundamental rights, and
these experiences help us understand why an employee classification for
Uber drivers might make more sense for jurists in one jurisdiction as
opposed to the other.
Although the Labour Court set the CCMA ruling aside, it is still useful
for a discussion about South African labor and employment jurisprudence.
In her decision, the Senior Commissioner focused her attention on the LRA
and its legislative history,120 providing a glimpse into some of the most
profound factors that inform post-apartheid jurists.  From the LRA’s text, it
is possible to gather the following three factors: (1) the fundamental labor
and employment rights enshrined in the Constitution of 1996; (2) South
Africa’s public international law obligations, especially as a member of the
International Labour Organization; and (3) a pro-union culture born from
the labor movement’s contributions to ending apartheid.121
During the apartheid era, the minority-led government implemented a
series of discriminatory labor policies, which denied black South Africans
and other non-whites livable wages and social mobility.122  To dismantle
this system, the Constitution’s drafters created a document infused with
ideals such as equality and positive labor rights.123  The Senior Commis-
sioner keenly addressed these ideals in her interpretation of the LRA,124
arguing that, in an effort to promote social justice and remain faithful to
the Constitution, it was crucial— in the case of Uber and its drivers— to
interpret the law in a way that “favour[s] the drivers, who are in a consider-
ably weak position when compared to Uber.”125
Where, then, does the point of divergence exist between South African
and Florida jurists, at least with regard to constitutional values and pro-
labor interests?  First, the Florida appeals court did not couch its decision
in constitutional terms nor did the decision mention any need to protect
wronged members of society from those with greater resources.126  Addi-
tionally, the U.S. Bill of Rights lacks any mention of positive labor
rights.127  Moreover, although rights like the right to strike are limited in
both South Africa and Florida, Florida’s state constitution places broader
119. See NEDLAC, supra note 88, ¶ 32, at 17.
120. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras.
52– 54.
121. See LRA 66 of 1995 §§ 1, 3 (S. Afr.).
122. See ILO, APARTHEID AND LABOUR: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF APARTHEID
ON LABOUR MATTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 18– 19 (1983).
123. S. AFR. CONST., 1996., ch. 2, §§ 9, 23.  For example, the drafters ensured that the
Constitution would protect everyone’s right to fair labor practices, regardless of a per-
son’s classification as an employee or independent contractor. See id. § 23(1).
124. See NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras.
52– 56.
125. Id. at para. 56.
126. See McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225– 27 (Fla. 3d Cir.
Ct. 2017).
127. Compare S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 23, with U.S. CONST. amends. I– X, XIV.
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limitations on the right to strike by prohibiting all public employees from
going on strike.128
The status of at-will employment in each jurisdiction also highlights
how most South African and U.S. lawmakers think of labor and employ-
ment rights.  At-will employment systems effectively empower businesses,
especially because employers in these systems can dismiss employees with-
out providing just cause.129  In South Africa, at-will employment does not
exist.130  In contrast, employment is presumed to be at-will in forty-nine
U.S. states.131  Some states, like Florida, tip the scale even further by fail-
ing to provide extensive exceptions to at-will employment relationships.132
As a member of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), South
Africa also has several international law obligations that inform its labor
policy and jurisprudence.133  To date, South Africa has incorporated
twenty-three ILO Conventions into municipal law.134  These twenty-three
conventions are indicative of a generally pro-employee legal system; for
example, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 98 of
1949 “protect[s] workers and their representatives against victimization by
their employers on account of their trade union activities.”135  The Free-
dom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 87
of 1948 also protects workers and their representatives from employers that
128. Compare S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 23(2)(c), with FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6.  In
South Africa, limitations on the right to strike exist for essential or maintenance service
workers.  LRA 66 of 1995 § 65(1)(d).  An “essential service” is a service that, if inter-
rupted by a strike or other event, “would endanger the life, personal safety or health of
the whole or any part of the population.” Essential Services— Application, Investigation
and Dispute Resolution, CCMA, https://www.labourguide.co.za/download-top/95-info
sheetsessential20services20-20info2/file [https://perma.cc/XH4L-SECJ]. A maintenance
service concerns working areas, plants, or machinery that would be “physically
destroyed” if the service is interrupted. Basic Guide to Maintenance Service Workers,
DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/legislation/acts/basic-guides/basic-
guide-to-maintenance-service-workers [https://perma.cc/X7K4-JDPL].
129. See The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[hereinafter At-Will Employment] [https://perma.cc/R3Q2-B4MW].
130. See LRA 66 of 1995 § 185 (S. Afr.).
131. See At-Will Employment, supra note 129.
132. See Laura Hendrick, At Will Employment Doctrine: How It Works & 4 Big Excep-
tions, FITSMALLBUSINESS (Jan. 8, 2018), https://fitsmallbusiness.com/at-will-employment-
doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/PZP8-GLFA].  One significant exception to Florida’s at-will
employment system lies in its whistleblower laws, which protect employees from
employer retaliation when they report or refuse to participate in an employer’s illegal or
unethical activities. Compare FLA. STAT. § 112.3187 (2017), with FLA. STAT. § 448.102
(2017).
133. See DARCY DU TOIT ET AL., LABOUR RELATIONS LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 64
(3d ed. 2000).
134. See Ratifications for South Africa, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102888 [https://perma.cc/
QU2X-62KX].  It is important to remember that ILO conventions do not become law
upon ratification. DU TOIT ET AL., supra note 133, at 64– 65.  Rather, in order for ILO
conventions to become binding, South African legislators must incorporate conventions
into an act of “legislative transformation,” such as “an Act of Parliament.” Id.
135. DU TOIT ET AL., supra note 133, at 65.
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act adversely to trade union interests.136
In contrast, ILO conventions do not have the same force in the United
States.  Although the United States is a member-state and donor of the
ILO,137 the United States has only ratified fourteen of the 189 ILO conven-
tions and two of the ILO’s eight core conventions.138  Generally speaking,
U.S. law and the ILO conventions provide similar protections against anti-
union discrimination; nevertheless, the ILO has surpassed U.S. law in the
protections it provides for women, children, and noncitizen workers.139
Thus, U.S. states like Florida are not necessarily bound by the same public
international law obligations as South Africa and its provinces.140
Finally, South Africa emerged from the embers of apartheid resistance
with a highly organized labor movement and relatively pro-union cul-
ture.141  As stated prior, the Constitution preserves several labor and
employment rights, which include the right to form and join a trade union
and engage in collective bargaining with employers’ organizations.142  The
LRA also refers to the rights that organizations enjoy when engaging in
collective bargaining,143 and in 2014, Parliament amended the LRA in an
attempt to ameliorate an institutional bias against minority trade
unions.144  Furthermore, although courts have yet to resolve the Uber
136. See id.
137. See The US: A Leading Role in the ILO, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/washington/ilo-
and-the-united-states/the-usa-leading-role-in-the-ilo/lang— en/index.htm [https://perma.
cc/8UG2-6MP7].
138. See Davis Weissbrodt, Compliance of the United States with International Labor
Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1842– 43 (2014).
139. Id. at 1871– 78.
140. See id. at 1878.  To empower American workers nationwide, the United States
would have to ratify more of the conventions that South Africa has ratified and incorpo-
rate these conventions into municipal law. See id.
141. The organized labor movement in South Africa is one of Africa’s most powerful
labor movements, having played a significant role in the democratization process.  Steve
L. Gordon, Individual Trust and Distrust in South Africa Trade Unions: A Qualitative Anal-
ysis, 2011– 2013, 42 POLITIKON 325, 327– 28 (2015). Interestingly, however, researchers
have identified dwindling levels of trust in trade unions in recent years, as well as a need
to increase engagement with disheartened working-class communities. Id. at 336, 340.
Events in 2012, such as the Marikana Massacre, as well as public discontent with the
government since the end of apartheid, may have contributed to these trends. Id. at
335– 36, 338– 39.
142. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 23(2)(a), (5).
143. LRA 66 of 1995 §§ 11– 22 (S. Afr.).
144. See LRA 66 of 1995 § 8(a) as amended by LRA Amendment Act 6 of 2014 (S.
Afr.); see also South Africa— 2015, ILO IRLEX, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/irlex/en/f?p=14
100:1100:0::NO::P1100_ISO_CODE3,P1100_SUBCODE_CODE,P1100_YEAR:ZAF,,
2015 (“[T]he 2014 Amendment Act allows for a Commissioner to grant collective bar-
gaining rights to unions that are not sufficiently representative.”) [https://perma.cc/
7H5U-T25T].  It is important to note that union members have not always agreed with
Parliament’s proposed amendments to the LRA, especially those proposed in November
2017. See Pavan Kulkarni, South Africa: Trade Unions Call for General Strike on April 25
against Anti-Labour Reforms, NEWSCLICK (Mar. 22, 2018), https://newsclick.in/south-
africa-trade-unions-call-general-strike-april-25-against-anti-labour-reforms (“[The] South
African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) has called for a general strike on [the] 25th
of April against . . . the amendments proposed to [the] Labour Relations Act (LRA) and
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA).”) [https://perma.cc/4PAH-T4LJ].
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dilemma, several Uber drivers have already organized under independent
labor organizations and trade unions, including the Guild and the
Movement.145
Although U.S. workers also enjoy the right to join unions, union mem-
bership in the United States lags behind other developed nations.146  In
2016, only 10.7% of the U.S. workforce was organized.147  Furthermore,
approval ratings for American labor unions have yet to reach the record
highs they enjoyed in decades past,148 and the proliferation of right-to-
work laws nationwide continues to negatively impact unions.149  For exam-
ple, Florida first passed right-to-work legislation in the 1940s.150  These
laws effectively disempowered unions by providing workers with blanket
access to benefits acquired via negotiations without obligating workers to
join a union or to pay crucial service fees.151  Today, right-to-work propo-
nents argue that “these laws create jobs, lead to higher wages, improve
union accountability, and are morally right because they do not compel
individuals to support a cause in which they do not believe.”152
145. Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure & Others
[2017] ZACCMA 1 at para. 61, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACCMA/
2017/1.html [https://perma.cc/G29E-57LG]; see also Kazeem, supra note 52 (“Around
500 of the 4,000 Uber drivers in South Africa have joined the South African Transport
and Allied Workers’ Union (SATAWU) with a view to possibly initiate legal action
against Uber, Zanele Sabela, the union’s spokesperson says.”).
146. Robert Gebelhoff, Why Are Unions in the U.S. So Weak?, WASH. POST (Aug. 1,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/08/01/why-are-
unions-in-the-u-s-so-weak/?utm_term=.C0cdb18c22bd [https://perma.cc/5XXB-GYRM].
147. See Jeff Cox, Disorganized: Union Membership Hit an All-Time Low in 2016, CNBC
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/26/disorganized-union-membership-
hit-an-all-time-low-in-2016.html [https://perma.cc/GHV4-4CK9].  Since 1970, American
union membership in the private sector has particularly seen a decline. A Brief History
of Unions: How Unions Have Fought for Fairness at Work Over the Years, UNION PLUS,
https://www.unionplus.org/page/brief-history-unions [https://perma.cc/E2XT-PHFP].
Although South Africa has seen a decline in union density in the private sector, union
members as a percentage of the workforce in the public and private sectors in 2013 were
still at roughly sixty-nine percent and twenty-four percent, respectively.  Haroon Bhorat
et al., Trade Unions in an Emerging Economy: The Case of South Africa 5 (DPRU, Working
Paper No. 2, 2014).
148. Art Swift, Labor Union Approval Best Since 2003, at 61%, GALLUP (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/217331/labor-union-approval-best-2003.aspx [https://
perma.cc/BBU7-67ZD].
149. Victor G. Devinatz, Right-to-Work Laws, the Southernization of U.S. Labor Rela-
tions and the U.S. Trade Union Movement’s Decline, 40 LAB. STUDIES J. 297, 300, 305
(2015) (illustrating state action against private and public sector unionism).
150. Id. at 297– 98.  Florida’s right-to-work law can be found in its state constitution.
FLA. CONST. art. I § 6 (“The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged by
membership or non-membership in any labor union or organization.”).
151. See Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://
www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations [https://
perma.cc/9EFL-MC4M].
152. Ozkan Eren & Serkan Ozbeklik, What Do Right-to-Work Laws Do? Evidence from
a Synthetic Control Method Analysis, 35 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 173, 173 (2015). In
their study, Eren and Ozbeklik demonstrate that right-to-work laws in Oklahoma
resulted in decreased private sector unionization rates, while also noting that their
research does not necessarily speak to the effects that right-to-work laws would have in
states with much higher private sector union densities. See id. at 191– 93.  Still, Eren and
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Unfortunately, right-to-work proponents forget that much of what we
understand to be right-to-work legislation is historically rooted in racist,
anti-Semitic, and anti-communist movements.153  In fact, Jim Crow apolo-
gists, such as Vance Muse— a Texas businessman credited with beginning
the push for right-to-work legislation in the United States— championed
these policies as a way to maintain a separation of the races in U.S. work-
places.154  Because of these laws’ racist origins, civil rights leaders like Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. urged U.S. workers to remain vigilant and “guard
against being fooled by false slogans, such as ‘right to work.’”155  Dr. King
recognized that right-to-work laws were merely attempts at “rob[bing] us of
our civil rights and job rights.”156  Although right-to-work advocates today
may not entertain the same overtly racist ideas as their predecessors, right-
to-work legislation can still upset the balance of power between employers
and employees.157
IV. An Employee Classification in Practice
Given the aforementioned factors, South African courts can reasona-
bly identify an employment relationship between Uber BV and local driv-
ers.  Once the courts classify Uber drivers as employees, however, two
questions remain: (1) How will this decision affect drivers, especially in the
midst of an ongoing Uber-Taxi war?  And, (2) how might this decision
affect Uber’s operations in South Africa?
A. Benefits to Drivers
After the courts classify South African drivers as Uber employees, driv-
ers can finally hold Uber accountable for its lukewarm response to their
needs.  As employees, drivers will enjoy the rights that the LRA and Basic
Conditions of Employment Act (“BCEA”) confer to South African work-
Ozbeklik recognize that their findings “may still shed light on the effects of RTW poli-
cies on local labor market outcomes.” Id. at 193.
153. Michael C. Pierce, The Racist Origins of Right to Work, LAB. NOTES (Aug. 3, 2017),
http://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2017/08/racist-who-pioneered-right-work-laws
[https://perma.cc/8JYH-K3JL].
154. Id. Vance Muse was quoted saying, “From now on, white women and white men
will be forced into organizations with black African apes whom they will have to call
‘brother’ or lose their jobs.”  Roger Bybee, Right-to-Work Laws Built on Racist Foundations,
PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://progressive.org/dispatches/right-to-work-laws-built-
racist-foundations/ [https://perma.cc/Y6HZ-PJZW].
155. Martin Luther King Jr. On ‘Right to Work’: ‘We Demand This Fraud Be Stopped’,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 11, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/mar
tin-luther-king-jr-right-to-work_n_2277023.html [https://perma.cc/CK62-B5HT].
156. Id.
157. See Andy Schmookler, The “Right -to-Work Con,” HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG
(July 6, 2016, 10:39 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-schmookler/the-right-
to-work-con_b_10831994.html (“The evidence shows that right-to-work laws reduce the
earnings of workers by a bit more than 3%, and that workers in right-to-work states are
also less likely to benefit from employer-sponsored health care and pension coverage.”)
[https://perma.cc/6Q6Q-AX37].
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ers.158  As stated previously, the LRA codifies several rights, including an
employee’s right to freedom of association and the right to not be unfairly
dismissed.159  As for the BCEA, its purpose is to “to give effect to and regu-
late the right to fair labour practices conferred by section 23(1) of the Con-
stitution” and “to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a
member state of the International Labour Organisation.”160
Nevertheless, the extent to which the BCEA can offer full protection to
Uber drivers as employees will depend on their annual earnings.161  Partic-
ularly, the Minister of Labour sets an annual earnings threshold amount
that determines Chapter Two’s reach.162  If an employee earns below the
threshold amount— currently set at R205,433.30— that employee will
receive full protection under Chapter Two.163  On the other hand, if an
employee earns over the threshold amount, the BCEA excludes the
employee from certain provisions.164  Hence, drivers whose earnings
exceed the threshold amount would not have the legal right and entitle-
ment to demand payment for overtime at a rate of one and a half times the
normal wage rate.165  Still, drivers would retain the legal right to negotiate
with Uber.166  Moreover, regardless of their annual earnings, the BCEA
would require that Uber regulate work hours in accordance with the provi-
sions dealing with occupational health and safety, among other factors.167
A ruling in favor of an employee classification would also entitle driv-
ers to protections under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and
Diseases Act (“COIDA”).168  Although Uber has implemented a series of
features to improve driver safety in South Africa,169 drivers that have suf-
fered attacks continue to face high medical care costs.170  According to the
Department of Labour, COIDA would apply if Uber drivers are injured or
killed as a result of physical intimidation and attacks on the job.171  If a
driver is killed as the result of an accident on the job, COIDA also confers a
158. See Amanda Arumugam, The Gig Economy— A Silent Revolution that is Set to
Change the Face of Employment Law, GOLEGAL (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.golegal.co.
za/gig-economy-employment-law/ [https://perma.cc/W6U4-3ZY3].
159. See LRA 66 of 1995 §§ 4, 185 (S. Afr.).
160. BCEA 75 of 1997 § 2 (S. Afr.).
161. See Andre Claassen & Jan Du Toit, The Basic Conditions of Employment Act:
Threshold Earnings, S. AFR. LAB. GUIDE, http://www.labourguide.co.za/conditions-of-
employment/643-the-earnings-threshold [https://perma.cc/BA7Y-6FKS].
162. BCEA 75 of 1997 § 6 (S. Afr.).
163. See Claassen & Du Toit, supra note 161.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See BCEA 75 of 1997 § 7 (S. Afr.).
168. See Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act [COIDA] 130 of
1993 § 22 (S. Afr.).
169. Burke, supra note 2; see also Why Uber Is Here to Stay— Despite the Taxi Violence,
BUSINESSTECH (Nov. 7, 2017), https://businesstech.co.za/news/mobile/209555/why-
uber-is-here-to-stay-despite-the-taxi-violence/ (discussing Uber’s efforts to protect driv-
ers) [https://perma.cc/PNV9-MQDY].
170. See Nzimande, supra note 49.
171. See Lloyd Ramutloa, Department of Labour’s Position in Terms of Uber Drivers and
CCMA Ruling, DEP’T OF LAB. (July 18, 2017), http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-
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right to the victim’s family to be compensated for their loss.172
Even so, in the event of a driver’s injury or death on the job, the right
to compensation for drivers and their families is not absolute.  In fact,
COIDA codifies the following exception: if an employee acted illegally,
against an employer’s orders, or without any orders from an employer at
the time of injury or death, then the event is not an accident as defined by
COIDA, and the employee and the employee’s family are no longer entitled
to compensation.173  Why is this exception important?  The increase in
urban violence has seen attacks on both sides of the Uber-Taxi conflict.174
If courts recognize Uber drivers as employees, Uber might challenge
requests for compensation by arguing that a driver acted against Uber’s
orders when the driver suffered injury or died on the job.  Moreover, Uber
does not place any limits on drivers’ work schedules— drivers can easily
switch on and off the app over the course of one day.175  Therefore, if a
driver or the driver’s family seeks compensation under COIDA, courts will
have to decide what it means for a driver to “act[ ] for the purposes of or in
the interests of or in connection with the business of his employer.”176
Will COIDA protections only apply when a driver is transporting a cus-
tomer?  Or, will it be enough for a driver to activate the Uber app before an
attack or retaliation?
B. Uber’s Business Model
Those who are opposed to classifying Uber drivers as employees point
to the effects that this decision might have on Uber’s operations in South
Africa.  One thing is certain: if Uber drivers are identified as employees,
Uber will have to rethink its business model.177  Still, the extent to which
Uber’s business model will have to change and the costs of an employment
relationship in general remain unclear.  Changes that Uber might have to
consider include reductions to the drivers’ direct pay from trips, as well as
retaining a smaller, more centralized group of full-time drivers.178
desk/media-statements/2017/department-of-labour2019s-position-in-terms-of-uber-
drivers-and-ccma-ruling [https://perma.cc/FA3E-WJXK].
172. See COIDA 130 of 1993 § 22(1) (S. Afr.).
173. See id. § 22(4) (S. Afr.).
174. See Masuabi, supra note 45.
175. See Drive with Uber Earn Money on Your Schedule, UBER, https://www.uber.com/
a/us/?var=org2&exp=70622_t2 [https://perma.cc/YP6A-UTF8].
176. COIDA 130 of 1993 § 22(4) (S. Afr.).
177. See Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here’s What It Would Cost Uber to Pay its Driv-
ers as Employees, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/17/
ubernomics/ [https://perma.cc/WJV9-BRYJ].
178. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Answer Will Shape the
Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribensha
har/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-will-shape-the-sharing-economy
/2/#31c180fc2cd2 [https://perma.cc/MX63-TYUD].  Nevertheless, under the BCEA,
Uber will be unable to implement deductions in remuneration unless the deduction “is
required or permitted in terms of a law, collective agreement, court order or arbitration
award,” or the drivers provide consent.  BCEA 75 of 1997 § 34 (S. Afr.).  Also, Uber can
only take so much from its drivers before they begin to disconnect from the e-hailing
app’s services. See Gandel, supra note 177.
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From a business-interest standpoint, many people see this shift in
worker classification as economically disastrous.  One estimate places the
cost of an employment relationship and increased benefits for drivers at
roughly $4.1 billion dollars.179  Opponents of an employee classification
also argue that it will constitute a stab at the gig economy and its success
as a secondary or temporary source of income for workers.180  Addition-
ally, opponents have expressed concerns over whether Uber will still be
able to offer its drivers the flexibility that has made the e-hailing company
successful.181
Although an employee classification will come at a price to Uber,
increased costs are no reason to misclassify drivers and ignore their basic
needs.182  For many drivers, Uber is their main or only source of income,
and employment protections are crucial for their financial wellbeing.183  As
one writer put it: “While imposing employment duties will increase fares
for riders and cut into profits, that is a fair price to pay for a more egalita-
rian political economy.”184  Additionally, like most start-ups, Uber relies
on investments for its longevity; hence, Uber may be able to afford these
changes as long as its investors remain faithful to the company.185
C. No Need for a New Labor Classification
To mitigate losses within the gig economy and decipher nebulous
labor relationships, some scholars suggest creating a new classification for
Uber drivers.  In fact, well before the rise of Uber and its competitors, coun-
tries worldwide experimented with labor classifications outside of the
employee-independent contractor dichotomy.186  Now, with increasing liti-
gation and accusations of misclassification, scholars are debating whether
a hybrid or new classification is the right choice for Uber drivers.187
It is important to remember that when envisioning new ways to clas-
sify Uber drivers, every jurist balances a worker’s needs and an employer’s
interests differently.  For example, some jurists propose classifications that
would provide drivers with basic protections, such as base-level pay; never-
179. See Gandel, supra note 177.  Uber has yet to confirm this estimate. See id.
180. Easton Saltsman, Comment, A Free Market Approach to the Rideshare Industry
and Worker Classification: The Consequences of Employee Status and a Proposed Alterna-
tive, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 209, 222 (2017).
181. See id. at 223.
182. See Gillian B. White, In the Sharing Economy, No One’s an Employee, THE ATLANTIC
(Jun. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/in-the-sharing-
economy-no-ones-an-employee/395027/ [https://perma.cc/ND2K-4BXC].
183. See id.
184. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to
Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 484 (2016).
185. See Gandel, supra note 177.  Just how long investors will have to stick by Uber
before it begins making money again is unclear. See id.
186. See Miriam A. Cherry, “Dependent Contractor” In the Gig Economy: A Compara-
tive Approach, 66 AM. U.L. REV. 635, 675– 76 (2017).
187. See Andre Andoyan, Comment, Independent Contractor or Employee: I’m Uber
Confused! Why California Should Create an Exception for Uber Drivers and the “On-
Demand Economy,” 47 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 153, 168– 69 (2017).
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theless, they do not go as far as including healthcare or worker’s compensa-
tion.188  At least within the United States, others have proposed a
classification where workers would enjoy select freedoms, like collective
bargaining and the freedom to organize, while employers would be free to
pool independent workers and provide medical insurance and other bene-
fits at group rates.189  Generally, the end goal for these new classifications
is to provide workers with some protection without (1) hindering innova-
tion, (2) increasing the price of ride services, and (3) adding to company
liability.190  Across the board, jurists also agree that employers will require
some legislative backing for this ideas to manifest real change.191
Unsurprisingly, critics have argued that a hybrid or new classification
might actually complicate an already puzzling situation.192  Tests for
hybrid classifications differ substantially across international jurisdic-
tions, and their criteria— including what percentage of a driver’s business
comes from the same principal— are difficult to measure within the context
of the gig economy.193  This difficulty leads to a significant amount of
unpredictability regarding non-traditional forms of employment.194  Fur-
thermore, problems with misclassification are not unique to the gig econ-
omy, and “providing for a specific category of worker in this sector would
artificially segment the labour market and employment regulation.”195
Accordingly, one wonders whether jurisdictions will have to create more
classifications as the labor market and gig economy diversify, and to what
extent these new classifications will rob workers of even more rights?
Several gig economy companies have already classified their workers
as employees,196 and as litigation against Uber increases worldwide, courts
should not make Uber drivers the exception.  Only when courts enforce
these employers’ obligations to their employees will companies like Uber
begin to recognize their drivers’ common humanity.197  When the Senior
Commissioner expressed her responsibility to protect weaker members of
society from those with greater resources,198 she reinforced an ongoing
188. Id.
189. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Kruger, The Gig Economy: How to Modernize the
Rules of Work to Fit the Times, MILKEN INST. REV. (May 2, 2016), http://
www.milkenreview.org/articles/the-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/2AM3-92N5].
190. See Alyssa M. Stokes, Note, Driving Courts Crazy: A Look at How Labor and
Employment Laws Do Not Coincide with Ride Platforms in the Sharing Economy, 95 NEB. L.
REV. 853, 881 (2017).
191. See id.
192. See Valero De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-In-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work,
Crowdwork and Labour Protection in the “Gig- Economy,” 19 (ILO, Working Paper No. 71,
2016).
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id. at 22.
197. See Rogers, supra note 184, at 484.
198. See Uber South Africa Tech. Servs. Ltd v. NUPSAW & SATAWU obo Morekure &
Others [2017] ZACCMA 1 at paras. 55– 56, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/
ZACCMA/2017/1.html [https://perma.cc/G6LG-4P96].
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concern about excessive power in labor relationships.199  In many ways,
this issue forms part of a greater cultural campaign to ensure that compa-
nies like Uber understand that Uber drivers are more than just “extensions
of platforms, apps, and IT devices” or “a new group invisible workers.”200
Conclusion
South Africa’s Uber dilemma has forced jurists to answer important
questions about the country’s largest black-owned sector: the taxi industry.
Since the days of apartheid, taxi drivers have struggled to secure their liveli-
hoods.  Lamentably, they have found themselves restricted by a legacy of
oppression that, despite significant progress, lingers on.  As of late, Uber
has exploded onto the transportation market, and labor courts must
decide whether Uber drivers fit within a system that never contemplated
the emergence of gig economy companies.  If future jurists continue to
draw inspiration from South Africa’s highly progressive constitution, inter-
national agreements, and pro-union culture, it is likely that Uber drivers
will soon see the day that a labor court classifies them as employees.
Accordingly, a hybrid or new labor classification for drivers is not a
viable solution for the Uber dilemma.  These classifications give equal
weight to corporate interests and disadvantaged workers’ needs, and they
fail to recognize the importance of protecting workers from businesses with
far more capital and power.  Moreover, although Uber claims that its busi-
ness model has provided drivers with an avenue for entrepreneurship,
these success stories ignore most drivers’ realities, which are characterized
by long, grueling workdays and unsustainable wages.  Hence, it is crucial
for jurists to understand that hybrid or new classifications unfairly com-
promise the rights and needs of historically oppressed groups.
Ultimately, the struggle for labor and employment rights in the gig
economy does not end here.  Not all Uber drivers are vehicle-owners, and
some vehicle-owners function as middle-persons between Uber BV and
hired drivers.  This situation raises questions about the existence of co-
employment relationships and whether an employee classification only
extends to some Uber drivers.  An employee classification also complicates
the situation for many foreign nationals who cannot find employment else-
where.  At some point, lawmakers will have to reconsider immigration and
naturalization laws that have made it difficult for foreign workers to make a
living in South Africa.  Finally, there are countless issues related to driver
and commuter safety that the State has yet to resolve.  Recognizing drivers’
rights as Uber employees, however, is a step in the right direction.
199. See Rogers, supra note 184, at 501– 04.
200. See De Stefano, supra note 192, at 21.
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